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Abstract:
The end of the Cold War more than a decade ago created a world in
which the relative stability between the two superpowers has disappeared.
On the other side, the 9/11 terrorist acts in US and consequently in Spain
(11/03/2003) and in UK (07/07/2005) exercised a lot of pressure on the
intelligences services to adjust to new threats by looking their past and
preparing for the future. Without exception, the Greek Intelligence Service
(NIS-EYP) is restructuring its tasks in order to be capable of confronting
new threats and protect the Greek national security. This article analyzes
the historical process of NIS-EYP, points out the new responsibilities of NIS-
EYP (Intelligence Council, Intelligence Bill) and makes suggestions for the
future challenges that the Greek intelligence Service has to face in the
21st century.
Introduction
As the Intelligence Community inexorably works its way into the
21st century, it faces an unprecedented array of challenges. The
chaotic world environment of the post Cold war offers a wide
array of different issues to be understood and a variety of new
threats to be anticipated. The rapidly developing information age
presents advanced and complex information technology and
methodologies to be mastered and integrated into the intelligence
process. (1)
Greece as an industrialized nation and active member of the
European Union as well as NATO calls for a higher level of man-
agement efficiency, effectiveness, and economy and employment
criteria. To create a Greek Intelligence Community that can mas-
ter those challenges and successfully continue to perform its role
of supporting national, political, diplomatic, economic and mili-
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tary decision-makers plus operational and tactical military com-
manders.
This article highlights on the challenges that the Greek
Intelligence Service (NIS-EYP) has to face into the 21st century. It
first describes the historical steps that took place to establish
today’s NIS-EYP. Second, it points out the legislative procedures
(Presidential Decrees) that the Greek Intelligence Community had
to go through as well as the new tasks of the Greek Intelligence
Service. Third, it concentrates on the development of the Greek
Military Service (Second Branch – A2) under the current changes
led in the transformation of the Greek Armed Forces; an overar-
ching strategic vision of C4ISR (Command and Control,
Communications, Computers and Intelligence) architecture and
systems; the capacity of creativity, ingenuity and intuition; a sense
of history; and an understanding of the basic issues and principles
of workplace diversity. At the concluding section, it points out
future challenges that the Greek Intelligence Service has to face in
the 21st century.
Historical Process of the Greek Intelligence Service
(NIS-EYP)
On May 9, 2003 the National Intelligence Service (NIS-EYP)
became 50 years old. In the Hellenic Republic, the first attempt to
construct an Intelligence Branch started in January 1926. A new
special intelligence branch was formed with the name “State
Security Branch” – (Geniki Asphalia). This intelligence branch last-
ed only one and half year and it was supervised under the
President of the government. Ten years later (1936), a new intelli-
gence branch was formed under the name “Defense Intelligence
Branch” – (Ypiresia Aminis), which was directly reported to the
Minister of Defense. In November 1936, the “Defense Intelligence
Branch” was renamed as “General Directorate of Foreign
Citizens” and it was supervised by the Minister of Public Order. Its
tasks included espionage, and counterintelligence. Despite the
limited sources, the “General Directorate of Foreign Citizens”
functioned positively on the espionage during the Second World
War. In 1946, a new military intelligence branch was established,
called “Military Protection Department” – (Ypiresia Prostasias
Stratevmatos). After three years (1949), General Alexander
Papagos renamed it as “General Directorate of Information” –
(Geniki Ypiresia Pliroforion) and it was under his supervision.
In 1952, when General Papagos became a Prime Minister, he
remained once again the “General Directorate of Information”
into “Central Intelligence Service and Research” – (Kentriki
Ypiresia Pliroforion and Erevnas, KYPE). The new intelligence



























foundation for today National Intelligence Service (NIS-EYP). (2)
A new intelligence branch was created as “Central Intelligence
Service” – (Kentriki Ypiresia Pliroforion, CIS, or KYP) and is estab-
lished according to western standards as a self-standing agency
being subject to the Prime Minister and having the country’s
national security as its mission. (3) From 1969 until 1974, the
“Central Intelligence Service” functioned as an independent pub-
lic service reported to the Prime Minister. (4) Under the statutes
enacted afterwards the CIS or KYP was successively subjected to
the Prime Minister, to the President of the Republic and as from
and subsequent to 1974 to the Prime Minister, to the Minister of
the Prime Minister’s Office and again to the Prime Minister.
After the end of the Second World War, NIS-EYP (formerly
known as CIS or KYP) main tasks were to track down communists
and antimonarchists. During the dictatorship era, under the
colonel George Papadopoulos (1967-1974), terrorist attacks
began to appear in Greece. Most of them work against the anti-
dictatorship resistance organizations that for the most part con-
centrated their attacks against the police, public officials, institu-
tions, and against foreign states which were believed to support
the “Colonels.” (5) CIS or KYP was one of the key elements sup-
porting the military junta. After the fall of the dictators, CIS or KYP,
in check by legitimate political forces, did not make the necessary
progress and this resulted in the failure of the Greek Intelligence
Services to solve a longstanding problem. However, these days,
NIS-EYP seems to follow professional ways to safeguard national
interests. (6)
The efforts by the former Prime Minister Constantine Karamanlis
conservative government after the 1974 to modernize the intelli-
gence service yielded few results. In the 1980s, the Socialists took
over the government and tried to bring NIS-EYP under control by
assigning party officials to it. The intelligence service was thereby
paralyzed under the burden of political patronage. NIS-EYP was
the first intelligence agency whose staff not only formed unions but
also even summoned general meetings in hotels.
The restructuring of the Greek Intelligence Service (NIS-EYP)
started in 1986 with a new Presidential Decree, N.D. 1645/1986,
which put the steps to transform the “Central Intelligence Service
(CIS or KYP)” towards its new name – “National Intelligence
Service (NIS-EYP).” Today NIS-EYP constitutes a self-standing civil
public agency and its political head is the Minister of Public Order.
(7)
The mission of the National Intelligence Service (NIS-EYP), as






















• The collection, processing and dissemination, to the compo-
nent Authorities, of information pertaining to the Country’s
National Security;
• Counterintelligence activities focusing on foreign Intelligence
Officers acting against the country;
• The security of national communications;
• In time of war or mobilizations the NIS-EYP, in parallel with its
above-mentioned powers, also becomes the country’s intelli-
gence staff.
Present Development: The Intelligence Council and Bill
The Intelligence Council is the coordinating body of the NIS-EYP
operations, as established under Law 1645/1986 (Article 6) and
Presidential Decree 360/1992 (Article 6). The Council exercises
its coordination functions based upon the decision issued by the
Foreign Affairs and Defense Government Council (KYSEA) and the
Prime Minister. The NIS-EYP director advises the Interior, Public
Administration, and Decentralization minister on all issues dis-
cussed and submits the Council’s opinion to him.
The Council meets every two months, or in an extraordinary
meeting, whenever it is deemed necessary by its chairman.
Chaired by the NIS-EYP director, the Council membership
includes the director of Intelligence and Security of the National
Defense General Staff, the director of the Directorate of State
Security in the Ministry of Public Order, and a senior representa-
tive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs appointed by the foreign min-
ister.
Furthermore, up to two senior representatives appointed by the
Interior, Public Administration and Decentralization minister may
attend meetings in accord with the nature of the issues being dis-
cussed. Representatives of other public agencies may only attend
– without the right to vote – when invited by the chairman. (8)
Before passing the baton of responsibilities for the Greek
Intelligence Service (NIS-EYP) to former Public Order Minister
Mihalis Khrissohoidis, outgoing Interior Minister Vaso Papandreou
signed the Presidential Decree proposed by the Service’s man-
agement, which was the result of a lengthy elaboration by experts
and university professors, chaired by constitutional law expert
Spiros Floghaitis. (9) The Presidential Decree was passed on 25th
of September 2002 and it established the steps towards the
reform of the Greek Intelligence Service (NIS-EYP). (10)
When taking office at the Ministry, former Interior Minister, Mrs.
Vaso Papandreou promised a comprehensive upgrading of the
National Intelligence Service (NIS-EYP), which is now being imple-
mented. Besides, NIS-EYP staff seems not to be objecting to the
Prime Minister’s decision to transfer the responsibilities to the82
Public Order Ministry and is waiting to see proof of the Service’s
upgraded role, and also of its active participation in securing a
safe environment in light of hosting the 2004 Olympic Games.
The restructuring of the NIS-EYP comes at a time during which
police has suddenly been making great strides in its way on
domestic terrorism, during which NIS-EYP has been effectively
sidelined because of weaknesses it had shown in this task in the
past. But they were clearly connected to the fact that for many
years NIS-EYP had lost its way, did not function as a national intel-
ligence agency, and furthermore, was believed to have been infil-
trated by other agencies.
Another important innovation is that NIS-EYP will, from now on,
be accountable to the Greek Parliament. Each year the Public
Order Minister, as the civilian head of NIS-EYP, will submit a report
of the year’s activities to Parliament, strengthening its institutional
functioning in the context of the democratic system. Finally, the
Intelligence Bill aimed at the revival of NIS-EYP and it’s function-
ing on a professional basis, while also instituting guarantees on
human rights and citizens’ privacy. 
New Responsibilities for the Greek Intelligence Service (NIS-
EYP)
Intelligence services are by nature opaque. In order to prevent
their inherent tendency toward autonomy, the Greek State needs
to introduce mechanisms for political and internal balances.
These checks should not undermine its operative ability but pre-
vent the emergencies of the usual degenerative phenomena.
Meanwhile, an advanced proposal for the creation of a new spe-
cial task force will signal the introduction of a new task to NIS-EYP
“traditional” duties under its current reform strategy by introduc-
ing seven basic innovations, which will enter NIS-EYP into the 21st
century: (11)
• A Research Study Center is created with the purpose of coop-
eration with scientific organizations, universities and special-
ized research institutes. It will undertake the drafting of studies
and analyses of issues of interests to the National Intelligence
Service (NIS-EYP); 
• A Staff (strategy) Planning Council (steering committee) is cre-
ated regarding the Service’s (NIS-EYP) policy and for crisis
management;
• Emphasis is placed on training with the creation of a “Training
Directorate”, aiming for modern training, education and spe-
cialization of personnel; 
• A Sub-Directorate for National Issues is created; 
• A Directorate for International Cooperation is created for bet-






















• A Sub-Directorate for International Terrorism and Organized
Crime is being established for the National Intelligence
Service (NIS-EYP) to be able to reply to the needs of the new
era; 
• A New Operation Center together with an Open Sources
(OSINT) Center;
• The NIS-EYP staff is allowed to carry arms in the execution of
special operational duties. 
Under NIS-EYP’s reorganization, the provisions of the Civil Service
Code are extended to cover the National Intelligence Service civil-
ian personnel, which include the personnel in specific beneficial
provisions. According to the new organizations positions for
1,800 civilians personnel, 80 for Armed Forces from the rank of
captain up to the brigadier, 75 Greek Police officers from the rank
of lieutenant to police brigadier, 15 Coast Guard officers from the
rank of ensign to captain and 700 petty officers and privates from
the Armed Forces, the Coast Guard or lower ranking employees
from the Police Force for the national intelligence service (NIS-
EYP) security. (12) In addition, NIS-EYP has 211 civilian intelli-
gence analysts, as well as 48 people who work as administrative
staff. (13)
The new structure indicates a significant reduction in the num-
ber of uniformed staff, which is a development in keeping with the
international models in this sector. Aside from the personnel’s
obligations resulting from their status as civil servants, each mem-
ber of staff serving in NIS-EYP is obliged, among other points, to
inform NIS-EYP in detail of any travel abroad, the unions or
organizations of any category or nature in which he or she partic-
ipates. (14) It should be noted that, according to law 2738/1999,
it is forbidden for NIS-EYP staff to strike or to form a union groups.
Despite the law, unions still exist inside the NIS-EYP today.
Moreover, as former Minister of Public Order, Mihalis
Khrissokhoidis stated when welcoming former Deputy Minister,
Evangelos Malesios to the Ministry of Public Order, “the NIS-EYP
is being called to play a new, significant role in consolidating
national security. The Greek government is evidently aware of the
increased demands and will secure the requisite funds in light of
the debate on the new budget in the Greek Parliament.” (15).
Restructure of the Greek Military Intelligence Service
The competition that often emerged between NIS-EYP and the
General Staff, “forced” the leadership of the YEETHA (Greek
Armed Forces General Staff) to make its information service inde-
pendent. Thus, in early 2000, under former General Manousos
Parayioudhakis, YEETHA established an independent information




























of upgrading and modernizing the existing sector, which operated
under the Second Branch (A2) of the General Staff. (16) Branch
A2 (Military Intelligence Service) of the Greek Armed Forces
General Staff is charged with organizing an integrated informa-
tion collection and assessment system for military information.
(17) As such it collaborates with the relevant civilian bureaus and
agencies within the country and allied agencies within the
European Union and NATO frameworks. In this capacity it informs
the General Staffs on intelligence and security matters and oper-
ationally controls the newly-created joint headquarters.  
The reform changes that take place in the Greek Military
Intelligence are: 
1. A New Special Bureau for the support of the Service Director
with a legal, diplomatic, and scientific counselor; 
2. A YEETHA (Greek Armed Forces General Staff) Operations
Support Directorate is established to divest itself from infor-
mation collection and dissemination allowing it to concentrate
on operations. The Directorate will include an Information
Section covering current information and support for the
Crisis Management System and the National Operations
Center – an exercising and planning section and a Head
Quarter (HQ) security section; 
3. Within the processing, policy, planning and dissemination
department, the Warning Assessment Section is activated,
(independent Balkan Unit is established), and training is dele-
gated to the Support Directorate. In addition, an
Asymmetrical Threat Unit is established; 
4. A Communication and Computer Support Directorate is
established to support and develop the relevant sectors; 
5. An Information Unit is established to support the Service oper-
ationally and for the exploitation of strategic level means of
information collection (satellite imaging, satellite communica-
tions, etc); 
6. The Military Attaché Section is upgraded to a Directorate
dealing both with Greek attaches abroad as well as foreign
attaches in Greece. The Directorate will also handle all bilat-
eral issues; 
7. The Counter-Information Security Unit is upgraded to a
Directorate in order to be capable of dealing with new secu-
rity issues, especially in light of the 2004 Olympic Games; 
8. The new structure and the implemented reform changes with-
in the structure (which have not been covered in detail) will
present YEETHA (Greek Armed Forces General Staff) with the
instrument it needs to gather, manage, and disseminate intel-
ligence in a manner that is timely and efficient, making it pos-
sible to pursue joint operations unhindered in war or in oper-






















Greek Intelligence Service (NIS-EYP): Future Challenges 
Greece needs a modern and efficient intelligence service that can
collect and process information that is able to plan and carry out
secret operations for the protection of the national interest. The
practice of staffing NIS-EYP with military officials and police offi-
cers has failed. It needs a new generation of highly skilled officers
and modern technological equipment. 
However, it is significant to give credits to the productive role of
the NIS-EYP towards the break-up of the 17 November terrorist
group by coordinating its actions with the Greek Police – Counter
Terrorist Branch (CTU). A mistake of one of the 17 November ter-
rorists in a bombing attack unlocked the front door of 17
November terrorists. The Greek Police connected older unexploit-
ed evidence to the new facts and managed to arrest the majority
of the 17 November members. 
The reasons for the dissolution of the main terrorist group (17
November) was the loss of the public’s favor or tacit acceptance,
the lack of ideology, the internal degeneration of the organiza-
tions, the loss of contact with political reality, the recently rein-
forced professionalism of the Greek authorities, the political will
of the State, and certainly the substantial NIS-EYP cooperation
with foreign intelligence services such as CIA, FBI, BND, DGSE,
MI6, and Mossad.
Overall, intelligence is in an exquisitely awkward position in
adapting to a changed world. It is a service industry, one designed
to serve Greek foreign policy, but how can it do so when the def-
inition of Greek interests and policies are themselves in flux? It is
charged with providing information to its decision makers, (who
most of the time), are in the process of redefining their objectives.
The National Intelligence Service (NIS-EYP) will not have the lux-
ury of waiting for the changes to solidify. 
Therefore, NIS-EYP needs to follow the rest of the western intel-
ligence agencies, which have undergone massive internal
changes in recent decades that could be said to constitute
reforms. NIS-EYP has to change the nature and extent of its
recruitment policies; it has to ensure that its staff is more repre-
sentative of the population it serves; its personnel policies, in
terms of career paths, complaints procedures and the like have
been brought increasingly closer to the public service norm
(sometimes because of serious personnel problems); its manage-
ment practices to begin to match those in the private sector more
closely; the NIS-EYP should consider seriously to acquire new
headquarters facilities. Much of the internal modernization has
occurred in the NIS-EYP, but it has to adapt to a new external pol-
icy context because of the end of the Cold War, as well as to be
subjected to a steadily increasing degree of oversight and86
87
accountability from the appropriate committees at the Greek
Parliament.   
They will, of course, have to embody the qualities of high
national security and professional intelligence competence as well
as the undoubted integrity that leaders of the Greek Intelligence
Community have always had. But they will also have to have the
quality of vision, so that they can foresee an Intelligence
Community of the 21st century that is realistic, credible, and
attractive future, but is different and better in important ways than
that which now exists. They will also have to have the inspirational
qualities required to communicate that vision in ways that will
motivate the Greek Government, the Greek Parliament and the
Greek Intelligence Community members to share in it, so that it
can be implemented. 
Despite the swirling changes that NIS-EYP has undertaken in the
last years, enough is known of the world that intelligence will con-
front beyond 2010 to begin the reshaping. That world will require
intelligence to be dispersed, not concentrated; open to a variety
of sources, not limited to secrets; sharing its information and
analyses with a variety of would-be coalition partners, including
foreigners and people outside government, not guarding its
“secrets” tightly. (18) At last, no matter what measures are adopt-
ed, NIS-EYP will not be capable of delivering timely and accurate
intelligence to the policy makers unless it is protected from politi-
cal pressures. Therefore, the Greek government should seek to
keep the more threatening intelligence operations within reason-
able limits, particularly those linked with diplomacy.
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